Lights out this winter? Why Britain's grid would fail a North Sea safety test – Richard Lyon
Richard Lyons warns Britain’s grid is being run in a way that relies too much on the goodwill of neighbouring countries
Will the lights go out this winter? The honest answer is probably not, but possibly, and the odds are getting worse. The National Energy System Operator, which runs Britain's grid, expects enough spare capacity, comfortably within the government's reliability standard. The energy minister calls talk of imminent blackouts irresponsible.
Kathryn Porter, an energy analyst who advises MPs, is less comfortable. “We have to be lucky all the time,” she told the Mail on Sunday. “Losing one big power station or one big interconnector would be enough.”
This winter Britain expects to rely on imports at peak, from neighbours already squeezed by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a squeeze I warned of in June. ‘Probably not’ is a forecast. In a safety-critical industry, it is not an answer either.
And the grid is safety-critical. Winter already kills. In 2024-25, the latest winter counted, about 2,700 more people died in Scotland than in the rest of the year, and 25,800 more in England. Most were old, many were ill, and some died because their homes were cold.
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Winter power cut would be catastrophic
Electricity is what stands between those people and the weather: the boiler's controls, the oxygen concentrator, the hospital, the phone. The government's own risk register plans for a national power cut in winter and rates the impact as catastrophic. When Spain lost power for ten hours on a mild April day last year, researchers counted about 167 extra deaths. A system on which lives depend should be run like one.
I spent 25 years running oil and gas operations worldwide, some of it in the North Sea, for BP, Dana Petroleum and E.ON. Safety there rests on the safety case, introduced after the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster. The burden of proof lies with the operator. Before an installation may operate, it must show the regulator, in writing, that every hazard that could cause a major accident has been identified and every risk reduced as low as reasonably practicable, not merely to a target.
The equipment that stands between a fault and a disaster must be listed, held to stated standards and checked by an independent verifier. The management of safety must be audited by people independent of it. The regime demands much more, but three habits it instils are enough to test Britain's grid: design against failure, keep a second line of defence, and investigate every close call as if it were the accident. On the public record, Britain’s grid fails all three.
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Relying on imports of electricity
Design first. Offshore, you don’t accept a design whose normal operation depends on good weather or a neighbour's goodwill. Britain's grid now does, by design. The operator's own outlook for this winter assumes Britain will be a net importer of electricity.
On June 23, in a heatwave, it had to cut exports to the Netherlands by emergency order and ask France for help. On September 28, on a still afternoon, it warned it was 1,400 megawatts short for the evening peak, until the market found the power.
Our neighbours share our weather, and in a real squeeze governments will look after their own customers and stop exporting. The defence is that the emergency tools worked. Offshore, needing them at all is a warning, and repeated warnings send the design back to the drawing board.
Next, the second line of defence. Offshore, you never remove one until its replacement is proven. Scotland has done the reverse with the power stations that run whatever the weather. Longannet, its last coal station, closed in 2016. Hunterston B's reactors stopped in 2022.
Torness, the last nuclear station, is due to close in 2030, leaving Peterhead as Scotland’s last large gas plant. Each closure had its reasons. None has waited for its replacement.
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System security ‘compromised’?
Over a year Scotland exports electricity, because when the wind blows it has plenty. But the cold, still evening is the one that matters. Holyrood has ruled out a replacement: it “does not support the building of any new nuclear power stations in Scotland under current technologies”. Offshore, refusing to replace a worn-out barrier is how people get killed, and the manager who allowed it would lose his job.
Last, investigation. Offshore, a near miss is investigated as if it were the disaster, by people independent of the decisions being examined, and the lessons are shared across the industry. After June 23, the grid operator's own first report, written within hours, said the “system security was compromised”.
The operator has confirmed that report is genuine, but calls it preliminary, and maintains the system was secure throughout. Perhaps it was. But the way the matter is being settled would not survive an offshore audit.
Ofgem, the regulator, commissioned the operator to review its own conduct, under Ofgem's oversight, promising publication “in due course”. More than three months after the event, nothing has been published. Offshore, an operator that marked its own homework on a near miss would have its safety case challenged.
None of this means the lights will go out this winter. However, if they stay on, the system will not deserve much credit. Nobody who has run a North Sea installation would accept this.
There is one thing that could be done before winter arrives. The operator's review of the June 23 incident should be published in full, and checked by engineers who answer neither to the operator nor the regulator. Scotland's MPs and MSPs should demand it. Offshore, a close call is a free rehearsal, and its lessons would be on every noticeboard by now.
The lights will probably stay on this winter. ‘Probably’ is not a safety margin.
Richard Lyon is an energy economist and former North Sea operations manager. His book, The Energy Trap, is published by Swift Press
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